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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1997 the Scottish people voted both for the creation of a legislative Parliament and to 
endow the Parliament with tax-varying powers. The establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 
2000 heralded the most radical innovation in the regional fiscal system in modern U.K. history. 
This development has been the subject of considerable controversy, however, especially in respect 
of the decision to afford the Parliament the power to alter the basic rate of income tax by up to 3p 
in either direction. The fact that Scotland, at least according to official data, receives a substantial 
net fiscal transfer from the rest of the UK, and has traditionally had higher public expenditure per 
capita than England, leads most commentators to believe that the power to change the standard 
rate will, in practice, be restricted to the power to increase it (Blow et al, 1996; McGregor et al 
1997).  Accordingly, while the Parliament allows the use of the power to generate a balanced-
budget contraction in expenditure, we focus here on the impact of a balanced-budget fiscal 
expansion. While Labour, SNP and the Liberal Democrats in Scotland all supported the 
introduction of a Parliament with tax-raising powers, the Conservatives labelled this scheme the 
“tartan tax” and claim that its use would be detrimental to Scotland, leading to a reduction in 
Scottish employment and to net out-migration.  
 
This political controversy, together with the national Labour Party’s desire to shed its 
reputation as a Party of high taxation, in part accounted for the Scottish Labour Party’s 
commitment not to exercise the tax-varying power during the lifetime of the first Scottish 
Parliament, despite the fact that others have meanwhile been vigorously arguing the case for full 
fiscal autonomy. In this paper we focus primarily on the consequences for the Scottish economy if 
the Parliament chooses to exercise the degree of fiscal autonomy that it already possesses. 
However, the factors that govern the likely macroeconomic impact of a balanced budget change 
also prove critical to the analysis of any region-specific tax or expenditure change, whether 
generated as a consequence of, for example, rigorous adherence to the Barnett formula (that, at 
least in principle, governs the allocation of government expenditure to the devolved authorities in 
the UK, et al 2003, 2007) or movement towards greater fiscal autonomy. Accordingly, we also 
identify the implications of our analysis for the wider debate on regional fiscal issues in general 
and greater fiscal autonomy in particular. 
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While the literature on fiscal federalism provides an obvious reference point for our 
analysis (e.g. Oates, 1972, 1999; Cornes and Sandler, 1996, chpt. 11) we have two concerns about 
its direct applicability in the present context. First, those who have sought to apply this approach 
in a UK context have been careful to note its North American origins (e.g Hughes, 1987; Smith, 
1996). In particular, its primary concern with local public goods provision and its tendency to 
assume perfectly competitive labour markets and instantaneously perfect labour mobility appear 
severely to circumscribe its direct applicability to the present UK (and European) regional 
context. Secondly, while the micro-theoretic literature is impressive, it is predicated upon an 
assumption that greater fiscal autonomy will be neutral in its impact on regional macro-
economies. There can be no such presumption in the UK regional context with respect either to 
Scotland’s current limited tax varying power or to the full fiscal autonomy advocated by some. 
Accordingly, we choose to employ a theoretical model, which we outline in Section 2, that is a 
long-run, regional and explicitly general equilibrium variant of the disaggregated  Layard, Nickell 
and Jackman (1991) model, characterised by the presence of imperfections in the labour market, 
in particular, and so appears more relevant to the U.K. and European contexts, although we would 
emphasise the applicability of our approach wherever labour markets are imperfect. Furthermore, 
the macroeconomic focus of this approach corresponds more closely to the traditional concerns of 
regional economic analysis in the U.K. and to the central features of the current policy debate, and 
of course avoids the presumption of macroeconomic neutrality. However, we do augment the 
model both to accommodate the possibility of the fiscally-induced migration that is emphasised by 
the fiscal federalism literature, and also to allow for any impact of regional-specific taxes on 
regional wage determination. This is a factor that tends to be neglected by the North American 
literature, probably because of its widespread assumption of competitive labour markets.  
 
Our theoretical analysis, in Section 3, identifies the conditions that govern whether 
employment and population in a small, open region such as Scotland would ultimately be likely to 
expand as a consequence of the introduction of the “tartan tax”. Significantly, our analysis 
generalises the conventional Keynesian balanced budget multiplier model to allow for supply side 
effects and for endogenous capital and population stocks in a regional context. We show that 
negative employment and population balanced budget multipliers are possible, reflecting a 
regional “inverted Haavelemo effect” of the kind noted in a national context by Knoester and van 
der Windt (1987). The qualitative outcomes are shown to depend critically on the values of two 
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key parameters reflecting the marginal valuation of the increased government expenditure 
(relative to the reduced consumption) by migrants and the extent to which this valuation 
moderates the degree of “tax-shifting” that occurs in the regional wage bargaining process. These 
parameters also govern the supply-side impacts of any regional-specific government expenditure 
or tax change, including, for example, any that may be required to move towards more balanced 
regional public sector budgets as a consequence of the introduction of greater fiscal autonomy.  
 
While the theoretical analysis is instructive, it is also limited in that: even qualitative 
results depend on the values of key parameters; it is confined to the single sector case considered 
by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991); it is restricted to the long-run; it is, of course, incapable 
of offering any estimates of the likely orders of magnitude of responses to the levying of the 
“tartan tax”. While some of these restrictions could, in principle, be explored analytically others 
cannot be, and it proves more convenient and instructive to examine them numerically, with the 
help of a computable general equilibrium model (CGE) of the Scottish economy. The use of CGEs 
to evaluate the likely impacts of fiscal innovations is now well established both at the national 
(e.g. Shoven and Whalley, 1992) and regional (e.g. Hirte,1998; Jones and Whalley, 1988; Morgan 
et al 1989,1991; Robinson et al,1996) levels.1  In Section 4 we set out the structure of AMOS, our 
CGE of Scotland, which represents an empirical implementation of (a fleshed out version of) the 
skeletal theoretical model that we outline in Section 3. In Section 5 we simulate the impact of the 
tartan tax on long-run equilibria, and in Section 6 we explore a number of extensions. We 
conclude the paper in Section 7 by identifying the implications of our analysis for future research 
and for the wider debate on regional fiscal issues. 
 
2. THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
We adopt a long-run, open-economy model of the region which is in the spirit of the 
disaggregated model developed by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, chpt. 6 )(henceforth LNJ), 
with imperfect competition in the regional labour market and some central government transfers. 
We employ the small-region assumption that the price of imports and the cost of capital are both 
determined exogenously in perfectly integrated national markets.  However, we do not assume 
that the law of one price holds for the region's exports but rather employ conventional trade 
functions (e.g. Armington, 1969; Engle and Rogers, 1996): whilst regional output is produced 
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under conditions of perfect competition within the region, it is not a perfect substitute for the 
output of other regions.2  This permits adjustments in the price of the regional good relative to the 
price of extra-regional goods and imports, and allows variation in the regional real and nominal 
wage in the long run.  Production occurs under a well-behaved, linear homogeneous production 
function with two factors, capital and labour.  All households are assumed to be homogeneous, so 
that there is no distinction between workers and voters or migrants and non-migrants. We 
concentrate here on a comparative-static long-run analysis.  This implies that both the regional 
capital stock and population are optimally adjusted: there is zero net investment and zero net 
migration in equilibrium states.  We adopt the LNJ regional migration function.3 
 
We approach the analysis of the balanced budget fiscal expansion (henceforth fiscal 
expansion) in the following way.  At the present time, the precise composition of the additional 
expenditure to be financed by any use of the tartan tax is of course unknown. In this paper we 
simply assume that the increased government expenditure generates a regional-specific amenity 
whose existence is generally reflected in a shift in the zero net migration function (e.g. Tiebout, 
1956).  We also argue that, in an imperfectly competitive labour market, the fiscal expansion 
affects the real wage bargaining function.  We focus on the key role played by the nature of these 
migration and real wage bargaining effects in determining changes in aggregate regional activity 
consequent upon the introduction of the fiscal expansion.  We begin with a more detailed 
specification of our analytical model. 
 
The formal model is given in Table 1.  Equation (1) is the zero net migration condition.  In 
this equation, the post-tax real consumption wage (w) is negatively related to the regional 
employment rate (e) since, across zero net migration equilibria, a high local wage is compensated 
for by a low local employment rate.  The employment rate is the ratio of employment (n) to 
population (N) and this is expressed formally in equation (2).4 Equation (1) is rather 
unconventional in that we divide the post-tax real consumption wage by the term (1-t)β where t is 
the proportionate rate of income tax. This is an attempt to capture the effect on the migration 
decision of the locally-financed amenity.  Where individuals attach a zero value to this amenity,  β 
= 0 and the standard formulation of the net migration condition applies, with the post-tax real 
consumption wage governing migration decisions.  However if, as is emphasised in the literature 
on fiscal federalism, there is a positive amenity effect then β > 0, and the value of this parameter 
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measures the potential migrant's relative marginal valuation of public expenditure versus private 
consumption.  This implies that, for a given employment rate, the larger the value of β, the lower 
the post-tax real consumption wage required to preclude net outmigration.  When β =1 the 
potential migrant is indifferent between marginal changes in local public expenditure and private 
consumption so that in this case the pre-tax real consumption wage motivates migration.  Where  
β > 1 there is a positive marginal preference for local public expenditure over private 
consumption.5 
 
The pre-tax nominal wage (W) is defined in equation (3), where cpi is the regional 
consumer price index.  Equation (4) expresses the regional consumer price index as a function 
solely of the regional nominal wage.  This parsimonious specification is permitted by the import-
price and cost-of-capital exogeneity assumptions, together with the linear homogeneous nature of 
production.  Labour demand is given by equation (5).  This is taken to be negatively related to the 
nominal pre-tax wage through competitiveness and factor substitution effects.6  Labour demand 
will also be a positive function of the tax rate as a reflection of the operation of the conventional 
Keynesian balanced budget multiplier, the differential import propensities of public and private 
consumption expenditure, and the greater labour intensity of public sector activity. Additionally, 
there is a positive link between labour demand and the level of unemployment via the size of 
government transfers to the region.  It is important to note that equation (5) represents a general 
equilibrium relationship, constructed on the basis of full income endogeneity.7  Equation (6) 
defines the level of  unemployment in terms of the population level (N) and the employment rate. 
 
Equation (7) is the regional bargaining function with the real consumption wage positively 
related to the regional employment rate (LNJ, 1991).  In this formulation the local amenity 
generated by the expenditure is allowed to influence wage bargaining behaviour directly.  The 
parameter α, which takes a value between 0 and 1, reflects the extent to which the value of the 
amenity is taken into account in the wage bargaining process.  The possible amenity effects on the 
local bargained real wage appear to be neglected in the literature on fiscal federalism.  This is 
partly attributable to that literature's typical presumption of competitive labour markets.  Since the 
amenity is exogenous to the individual worker, it is ignored in the individual's work/leisure 
choice, so that only the post-tax real consumption wage matters.8  This corresponds to a situation 
where the value of α is zero.  However, in the bargaining context the scale of the amenity (under 
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the proposed form of the "tartan tax") is tied directly to income and therefore to the bargained 
wage, and a union that reflected its members’ preferences would be expected to act accordingly. 
This formulation of the wage-setting function has echoes of the "social wage" that enjoyed some 
currency under previous Labour administrations, although here the effect is region-specific. 
 
3. THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TARTAN TAX AND OTHER FISCAL 
INNOVATIONS 
 
If equations (1) - (7) in Table 1 are expressed in total differentials with the appropriate 
initial normalisation, we can solve for the change in the seven endogenous variables dn, dN, de, 
dcpi, dw, dW and dU, given the change in the value of the exogenous tax rate, dt.9  If we combine 
equations (1), (3) and (4) and set dt = 0, we can derive the initial zero net migration (ZNM) 
function in nominal pre-tax wage-employment rate space.  This is represented by the curve Z0 in 
Figure 1, which has a slope equal to we/(1-cpiW) < 0.  Similarly, with dt = 0 equations (3), (4) and 
(7) generate the initial bargained real wage function (BRW) in the same space, with a slope equal 
to be/(1-cpiW) > 0.  This is curve B0 in Figure 1.  These two curves are sufficient to tie down the 
initial nominal wage and employment rate WJ and eJ.  Where a local income tax increase of dt is 
levied, the ZNM function moves upwards by an amount equal to ((1-β)/(1-cpiW))dt. The local 
income tax increase also shifts up the BRW function, but by ((1-αβ)/(1-cpiW))dt. Note that, for the 
range of possible values for α and β, (1-αβ)dt is greater than or equal to (1-β)dt.  Given the 
positive sign of (1-cpiW), the upward movement of the ZNM function is never greater than the 
upward shift of the BRW function.10  It proves useful to establish some benchmark cases in Figure 
1. 
 
Consider first the case where β is zero, so that αβ is similarly zero.  This is where the 
additional public expenditure produces an amenity which has no value to local residents.  Under 
these conditions, both the ZNM and the BRW functions shift upwards by dt/(1-cpiW) to B1 and Z1 
respectively.  In each of these nominal functions the shift is such that at any given employment 
rate, the post-tax real consumption wage remains unchanged.  This implies an adjustment in the 
nominal wage which is greater than the tax to take into account the increase in the regional cpi 
and this is determined by the term (1-cpiW)-1 > 1.  The new equilibrium is at K.  The employment 
rate remains unchanged and the nominal pre-tax wage increases by dt/(1-cpiW), reducing regional 
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competitiveness. 
 
The situation where β = 0 is an extreme case.  Where β takes positive values, so that the 
increased local public expenditure generates a valued amenity, and where α takes a positive value, 
so that this is reflected, at least partly, in the wage bargain, the upward movement of the two 
functions is reduced.  As another benchmark, consider the situation where α = β = 1.  This is 
where the value of the increased public expenditure to local residents just equals the forgone 
private consumption implied by the higher taxes, and this is fully incorporated into the wage 
bargain.  Under these circumstances there is no movement in either curve.  The equilibrium 
remains at J.  There is simply a transfer of a part of the pre-tax wage to public expenditure: there 
is no change in the employment rate and no loss of competitiveness through higher nominal 
wages. 
 
For any β, where α = 1 both the ZNM and the BRW function shift by the same amount and 
the employment rate remains unchanged.  Where α < 1, the BRW function shifts upwards by more 
than the ZNM function, so that the new equilibrium involves a reduction in the employment rate 
and a corresponding rise in the unemployment rate.  For example, where β = 1, so that the relevant 
ZNM curve is Z0, the equilibrium lies on the line segment LMJ.  The equilibrium is closer to J, the 
closer α is to unity.  The equilibrium after the fiscal expansion will therefore be located 
somewhere in the shaded areas to the right of the B1 curve and to the left of the vertical line KJeJ.  
Where β < 1, the equilibrium lies within the darker-shaded triangle JKL; where β > 1 the 
equilibrium lies somewhere in the lighter-shaded area to the south-west of the line LMJ.  Note that 
where β < 1, the nominal wage must rise in long-run equilibrium, irrespective of the value of α, 
with a resultant loss of  regional competitiveness.  Also, where the wage bargain does not reflect 
the increase in local amenities (α = 0), the  bargained wage function is B1.  In this case, the ZNM 
function has to drop to Z2, associated with a β value substantially above unity, before a loss of 
competitiveness accompanying the fiscal expansion is avoided. A competitive labour market 
effectively precludes a non-zero value for  α in the labour supply function because it contains no 
mechanism  by which the benefit of the publicly provided externality could be internalised. 
 
The zero net migration and bargained real wage functions tie down the wage and 
employment rate.  But whilst these are important variables, it is the change in employment and 
population which are the main subject of current debate.  From equations (2), (5) and (6) we can 
derive expressions which link the changes in employment and population to the changes in the 
nominal pre-tax wage, the employment rate and the tax rate: 
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where n1 and e1 are the initial values of the employment level and the employment rate, with n1 = 
e1 < 1 through the normalisation procedure.  In equation (8) the coefficients on the total 
employment, employment rate and tax rate change variables are all negative.11  This has the 
implication that employment change is positively related to increases in the tax rate and 
negatively related to increases in the nominal wage and the employment rate.  The direct causal 
links between employment change and the nominal wage and tax rate changes are as argued in 
section 2.  The negative relationship between employment change and the change in the 
employment rate operates through the effect on the level of unemployment and government 
welfare payments funded outwith the region.   
 
We know from the previous discussion that the introduction of the tax is accompanied by a 
non-positive change in the employment rate.  Therefore if there is a fall in the nominal pre-tax 
wage, there will be an unambiguous increase in employment.  However, where the pre-tax 
nominal wage rises, the change in employment will depend on the trade-off between the positive 
stimuli, coming through the aggregate demand and employment rate effects, and the negative 
stimulus from higher wages leading to a loss of competitiveness and the substitution of capital for 
labour.  This analysis echoes that of Knoester and van der Windt (1987) who argue that, at a 
national level, forward tax shifting by workers produces a fall in competitiveness and therefore a 
possible inverted Haavelmo effect; that is, a negative balanced budget multiplier.  In equation (9) 
again the coefficients on all the variables on the right hand side are negative, which makes 
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population also negatively related to the nominal wage and the employment rate and positively 
related to the tax rate.  This reflects the identity, expressed as equation (2), that population change 
equals the proportionate employment change minus the proportionate change in the employment 
rate. 
 
If dn and dN are set to zero, equations (8) and (9) can be used to construct zero 
employment change (ZEC) and zero population change (ZPC) functions in nominal wage-
employment rate space which can be plotted in Figure 1.  To avoid cluttering the diagram we 
restrict ourselves to presenting the ZPC function, though the corresponding employment function 
can be generated in an identical manner.  The ZPC function is given by P1.  It lies above the initial 
equilibrium J by an amount -(nt/nW)dt which is positive, given the negative sign of nW.  The slope 
of P1 is negative and equals (1+nU)/nW.12  Equilibrium points that lie above the ZPC function are 
associated with a fall in population and therefore negative balanced budget population multipliers. 
 Points below the ZPC function  experience increased population and therefore positive balanced 
budget population multipliers.  Figure 1 reinforces the argument made above.  Post-tax equilibria 
involving no increase in the pre-tax nominal wage are unambiguously associated with an 
expansion in population (and employment).  This includes the point J, which would be attained 
where α = β = 1.   Moreover there is a range of equilibria where the pre-tax nominal wage is rising 
and regional competitiveness is declining, but welfare improvements, as reflected in increased 
population, would occur.  These are equilibria in the area JPMQN. 
 
Analytical attempts to identify more precisely the conditions under which employment and 
population rise after the introduction of the tax prove to be unhelpful.  Expressions can be 
obtained but they provide no additional insight and include as arguments derivatives of what are 
general equilibrium relationships. However, the present theoretical framework can be adapted to 
analyse the consequences of any change in regional-specific tax rates or government expenditures. 
For example, a move to full fiscal autonomy from an initial position of a significant structural 
public sector deficit would create pressure for some combination of tax rises and government 
expenditure cuts. Suppose fiscal balance is improved through a rise in the tax rate. In this case the 
tax rise is not associated with any increase in expenditures, there is no amenity effect and β is zero 
as is αβ. Accordingly, a rise in the tax rate to reduce a pre-existing public sector deficit would 
induce adverse supply effects, in this case in addition, of course, to the adverse demand effects.  A 
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cut in government expenditures (except where β is zero), stimulates an upward shift in the ZNM 
function, and in the bargaining function (provided α  is non-zero).  Thus any cut in expenditures to 
balance the budget following a move to greater fiscal autonomy may have important adverse 
supply side effects additional to the impact on aggregate demand. Similar supply effects may 
accompany the demand effects implied by rigorous adherence to the Barnett formula. (Ferguson et 
al, 2003, 2007 explore the demand effects.) Of course, if the maintenance of overall fiscal balance 
allows expenditure increases or cuts in the tax rate, these supply side effects would act to 
reinforce the beneficial demand side impact on the Scottish economy. Actual and projected  public 
sector financial balances are therefore potentially important in any analysis of the likely 
macroeconomic impact of further fiscal autonomy. 
 
It would be possible to derive the bargained real wage function explicitly from the 
microeconomic theory of wage determination in the presence of trade unions (e.g. Oswald, 1982). 
Under perfectly competitive labour markets individual workers recognise that their action has no 
impact on the scale of the amenity effect associated with government expenditures, and so α is 
zero. Under a monopoly union it would be possible for the union wholly to internalise the amenity 
effect and incorporate it fully into its bargaining behaviour, with α and β here, for example, 
reflecting the marginal valuation of the median voter. Such a framework could accommodate 
endogeneity of the values of α and β with respect to a range of influences, including public policy. 
For example, if, as seems likely, the median voter’s preferences vary across different types of 
expenditures, then through partial hypothecation to expenditures that are particularly highly 
valued, the Parliament may be able to influence the scale of the amenity effect associated with any 
particular use of tartan tax revenues. Furthermore, while discussions with union leaders centred on 
the notion of a social wage are no longer a characteristic of the UK institutional structure, there 
may be scope for such activity at the regional level, given Scots’ traditionally stronger preferences 
for public expenditure. This could influence the extent to which wage claims are moderated in 
response to higher public expenditures and taxes (the value of α).  
 
The outcomes in the presence of multiple unions and a combination of national and 
regional bargaining systems in a repeated games context would be complex. However, it seems 
clear that such an analysis would not lead to substantial further restriction on the values of α and 
β: a range of outcomes would be feasible depending on individual worker preferences and the 
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precise nature of the bargaining system(s). Accordingly, we do not pursue these possible 
extensions here, but rather explore the implications of plausible ranges of values for both values 
of α and β through simulation. 
 
Further analytical work with the theoretical model we employ here does not help a great 
deal in identifying the likely impact of regional fiscal innovations, including a balanced budget 
expansion. A knowledge of the empirical values of α and  β is insufficient, in general, to tie down 
qualitative outcomes, although such knowledge is, of course, critical in any  attempt  to determine 
the likely quantitative effects of the tartan tax, or indeed any fiscal changes, regardless of their 
source (such as strict adherence to the Barnett formula or further fiscal autonomy). Unfortunately, 
there is very little evidence on the values of these parameters.  Existing UK empirical work on 
regional earnings and migration functions offers no direct evidence, since we have no experience 
of a local income tax. Furthermore, there is no consensus as to the nature of long-run tax effects 
on the bargained real wage even at the national level (Church et al, 1993), and the relevance of 
such evidence to the present regional context is, in any case, questionable. Finally, whilst there is 
evidence from other countries  on values of α and β, the results are extremely mixed and appear to 
depend on the composition of  public expenditures. (Bartik, 1992; Cebula, 2002; Dahlberg and 
Fredriksson, 2001; Dalenberg and Partridge, 1995; Mofidi and Stone, 1990; Day, 1992; Fisher, 
1997; Feld and Kirchgassner, 2002; Gabe and Bell, 2004; Helms, 1985; Wallace, 1993).  While 
the available empirical evidence therefore does not allow us to tie down the values of α and β at 
all precisely, our reading of the literature is that the tendency of conventional neoclassical analysis 
to ignore the potentially beneficial impacts of regional public expenditures is rejected by those 
studies that provide a balanced treatment of tax and expenditure effects (e.g. Gabe and Bell, 
2004). Furthermore, the suggestion that the composition of expenditures influences the values of 
key parameters implies that they are sensitive to policy choices. 
 
Against this background, the case for progressing the analysis via numerical simulation is 
compelling. Qualitative results, at least for employment and population change associated with 
balanced budget changes, as well as quantitative effects, typically depend upon the entire 
empirical general equilibrium system, as well as the values of α and β. Using a regional CGE 
counterpart to the analytical model of this section, we are able to estimate the likely size of 
employment and population effects via simulation over a plausible range of values for α and β. 
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This allows us to identify the combinations of these parameter values associated with positive and 
negative balanced-budget employment and population multipliers. The use of a CGE also permits 
us to extend the analysis of this section in a number of respects, notably to: capture the major 
sectoral effects resulting from the reduction in consumption and increase in government 
expenditures; examine the short-run effects of the tax changes; explore the impact of alternative 
assumptions about the nature of the net migration and wage bargaining processes; consider the 
possible impact of the tartan tax on the assigned budget of the Scottish Parliament; conduct a 
formal sensitivity analysis on the likely qualitative and quantitative effects of the tartan tax.  
 
4. AMOS: A MACRO-MICRO MODEL OF SCOTLAND 
 
AMOS is a CGE modelling framework parameterised on data from a UK region, 
Scotland.13  Essentially, it is a fully specified, empirical implementation of the skeletal theoretical 
general equilibrium model developed in the preceding section.  It has three domestic transactor 
groups, namely the personal sector, corporations and government; and three commodities and 
activities, manufactures, non-manufacturing traded and a sheltered sector.14  In all the simulations 
in this paper we impose a single Scottish labour market characterised by perfect sectoral mobility. 
All sectors are taken to be perfectly competitive and produce using multi-level CES production 
functions with elasticities of substitution of 0.3 (Harris, 1989).  We do not explicitly model 
financial flows, our assumption being that Scotland is a price-taker in competitive UK financial 
markets. 
 
There are four major components of final demand: consumption, investment, government 
expenditure and exports. Of these, real government expenditure is equal to the base year level plus 
an additional amount which just exhausts the increment to tax revenue raised by the local income 
tax. This implies that government expenditure becomes dependent on the entire general 
equilibrium of the system, which is exactly what would happen if the tartan tax were to be 
implemented.  Consumption is a linear homogeneous function of real disposable income. Exports 
(and imports) are determined via an Armington link (Armington, 1969) and are therefore relative-
price sensitive with trade substitution elasticities of 2.0 (Gibson, 1990).  Investment is a little 
more complex, in that the model can be run to produce either period-by-period short-run equilibria 
or a single long-run equilibrium.  In the long-run simulations capital stock is endogenous and 
determined on cost-minimisation criteria, with investment equal to depreciation at the optimal 
capital stock.15  In the period-by-period simulations, investment in each sector equals depreciation 
plus some fraction of the gap between the desired and the actual level of capital stock.16  
 
Population is endogenous in the simulations reported here and is updated from period to 
period in a similar way to the capital stock using the econometrically parameterised regional net 
migration function reported in LNJ (1991), augmented to accommodate the amenity effects 
discussed above.  This has the form 
)w - t)-(1 - w0.06( + )u - u0.08( -a  = m rsrs lnlnlnlnln β  
 
where: m is net inmigration as a proportion of the regional population; u is the unemployment 
rate; w is the real consumption wage; t is the additional income tax rate; a is calibrated on  
base year data; β is the relative valuation of the public expenditure; and the subscripts s and r 
indicate Scottish and rest-of-the UK (RUK) values.  In the long-run, there is an implied zero-net-
migration condition which yields estimates of the optimal spatial distribution  of population. This 
is: 
 
t)-(1 + u1.33 + b = w ss lnlnln β  
where b again is a calibrated parameter.  Wage setting is determined by a regional bargained real 
wage function that embodies the econometrically derived specification given in LNJ (1991), again 
augmented by amenity effects: 
t)-(1 + u0.113 - c = w ss lnlnln αβ  
 
where α represents the extent to which the amenity effect is reflected in the wage bargain and c is 
a calibrated parameter. 
 
  We present a compact form of the model in the appendix.17  AMOS in fact comprises a 
set of several hundred non-linear (in level and logs) simultaneous equations.18  We solve AMOS 
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in level form, using the Levenberg-Marquardt method, which is an algorithm that varies smoothly 
between inverse Hessian and steepest descent methods.  More detail on the algorithm, together 
with a full model listing is available in Harrigan et al (1991).   
 
5. SIMULATION RESULTS  
 
In this section, we use AMOS to conduct simulations to illustrate the long-run effects of 
the tartan tax on the Scottish economy.  The White Paper (Scottish Office, 1997a, p23) estimated 
that the tartan tax would raise £450 million at 1997 prices, which represents a 1.45 percentage 
point rise in average personal income tax in AMOS.19 In Table 2 we report the long-run 
proportionate changes in population after the introduction of such a tax for combinations of α and 
β  where α lies in the range 0 to 1 and β in the range 0 to 2.20  Figure 2 illustrates these results 
graphically. Table 2 and Figure 2 indicate not only that the tartan tax can produce positive or 
negative population effects, dependent upon the values taken by the bargaining and migration 
parameters, but also that, for plausible values of α and β, the tax could have a significant impact 
on aggregate economic activity in Scotland. 
 
The numerical results in Table 2 and Figure 2 are consistent with our theoretical analysis.  
For a given value of α, the proportionate change in population increases as β increases.  That is to 
say, the more the electorate value the amenity created with the revenues from the additional 
income tax, the greater the increase (or the lower the decrease) in regional activity and welfare.  
However, the extent to which the amenity effect is incorporated into wage bargaining is also a key 
determinant of the welfare impact of the tartan tax.  Take the situation where β = 1, so that 
Scottish residents are indifferent between marginal increases in private consumption and public 
expenditure.  If α = 1, then as our theoretical analysis suggests, population will rise.  This implies 
that if workers wish to make no adjustment in their pre-tax income after the introduction of the 
tax, the net effect on the Scottish economy will be expansionary. This case generates results that 
are similar to those identified with the standard Keynesian balanced budget multiplier, although 
here the result is, of course, critically dependent upon endogenous population and investment 
effects. However, if α lies below 0.73, population declines.  This is represented by point M in 
Figure 1.  As β increases, the range of values for α which generate population increases expands.  
However, note that if the amenity has no moderating effect on tax-shifting in the regional wage 
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bargaining process, so that α = 0, even a β value of 2 generates significant proportionate 
population losses. 
   
In Table 3 we give the proportionate changes in a more comprehensive set of economic 
variables for four particular combinations of α and β.  This allows a fuller investigation of the 
economic forces at work in each of these cases.  The results in the first column are derived where 
β = 0.  This corresponds to a situation where the amenity funded by the tax revenue has no value 
to Scottish residents and is represented by equilibrium at point K in Figure 1.  In this simulation 
there is no change in the post-tax real consumption wage.  The nominal pre-tax wage increases by 
1.75%, the full extent of the tax plus the rise in the consumer price index.  This results in an 
increase in value added prices in all sectors and a corresponding reduction in exports.  Scottish 
GDP declines by 1.33% and employment and population by 1.41%.  The percentage fall in 
investment is less than that in output and employment, reflecting the long-run substitution of 
capital for labour. 
 
It is important to note that the circumstances reported in column 1, where β = 0, is the 
"worst-case" scenario for the tartan tax (as is clear from Table 2).  In the second column we report 
results from simulations where α = β = 1.  This is represented by the equilibrium at point J in 
Figure 1.  The key characteristic of this simulation is that there is no change in either the pre-tax 
nominal wage or the employment rate.  This implies that there are no adjustments in long-run 
value-added prices, the cost-minimising choice of technique or exports.  Essentially the economy 
operates as an input-output system with output, employment and capital stock in each sector 
varying by the same proportionate amount.  The demand disturbance comes through the 
replacement of a proportion of private consumption expenditure by public expenditure.  As argued 
already, this has a general expansionary impact on the regional economy and produces an increase 
in Scottish GDP of 0.48% and in employment and population of 0.46%.  However, the adjustment 
in consumption and government demand has an uneven effect across sectors.  Activity in the 
sheltered sector, which is most strongly represented in government expenditure, increases by 
1.22% whilst the changes in activity in the other two sectors are very small and is actually 
negative in non-manufacturing traded, where consumption expenditures are concentrated. In 
effect, the results reflect the impact of an extended input-output system that is subjected to 
partially offsetting negative consumption and positive government expenditure changes. 
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The importance of the parameter α is illustrated in the figures presented in column three 
which are for a simulation where α = 0 and β = 1.  This simulation corresponds to the equilibrium 
represented by point L in Figure 1.  Here private consumption and public expenditure are equally 
valued at the margin but this is not reflected in the bargained wage.  We know from the previous 
analysis that the nominal pre-tax wage and the unemployment rate will rise, by 1.62% and 0.81% 
respectively in this case.  The results in this simulation are very similar to those where β = 0.  
There are strong negative competitive effects as exports fall in all sectors and this swamps any 
expansionary impacts coming through the final demand shifts and population effects.  Scottish 
GDP, total employment and population fall by 1.19%, 1.26% and 1.18% respectively, and this 
reduction in activity affects all sectors, though particularly the non-sheltered sectors. 
 
The final simulation, reported in column four, adopts the parameter values α = 0.80, β = 
1.20 and represents an equilibrium lying in the area JMQN in Figure 1 where both population and 
the nominal pre-tax wage increase.  The 0.28% rise in the pre-tax nominal wage following the 
introduction of the tartan tax reduces exports in all sectors.  However, the other expansionary 
demand impacts produce a more than offsetting effect on overall Scottish aggregate activity.  
Therefore, although employment falls in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing traded sectors, 
by 0.24% and 0.49% respectively, employment in the sheltered sector rises by 2.31% producing 
an aggregate increase in employment of 0.66% and an increase in population of 0.72%. 
 
6. ADDITIONAL ISSUES 
 
6.1 National Wage Bargaining 
 
Up to now we have adopted a local real wage bargaining framework for the determination 
of the regional wage.  However, it is often argued that within the UK the regional wage is set at 
the national level, either by national bargaining or through company-wide wage setting in multi-
plant firms.  This would imply that the pre-tax nominal wage is exogenous to the region and that 
the bargaining function B0 in Figure 1 can be replaced by a fixed pre-tax nominal wage line F0. In 
Figure 1, as long as the ZNM function cuts F0 at a point below the zero population function, 
population will rise.  Essentially, with national wage bargaining there are the familiar 
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expansionary demand effects associated with the shift from private consumption to public 
expenditure, but no adverse competitiveness impacts.  The only potential contractionary effect is 
where β < 1 so that the employment rate must rise to satisfy the zero net migration condition.  
However in the AMOS model, for all values of β, under national bargaining population increases 
with the introduction of the tartan tax.21 
 
6.2 The Scottish Assigned Budget 
 
In the analysis undertaken in this paper so far we assume that the tax-raising powers of the 
Scottish Parliament will not affect the level of the subsidy that will come to Scotland from 
Westminster in the form of the assigned budget (formerly the "block grant").  Since the present 
government insists that the Barnett formula will continue to govern the regional allocation of 
government expenditure, this seems a reasonable assumption.23 However, there is some concern in 
Scotland, fuelled by the considerable attention focussed on the Barnett formula by representatives 
of some English regions (e.g. Groom and Buxton, 1997), that even the limited fiscal autonomy 
that Scotland possesses may ultimately lead to a corresponding reduction in U.K. central 
government support.  Since there would be no net amenity effect if the tartan tax revenues merely 
replace existing subventions, this is similar to the case where β = 0, so that the nominal wage 
would rise by the full amount required to maintain the post-tax real consumption wage.  However, 
rather than a demand stimulus coming from the replacement of private consumption by public 
expenditure, there is now simply a contraction in Scottish private consumption.  Within AMOS, 
the introduction of the tartan tax without a corresponding increase in Scottish government 
expenditure generates a reduction in employment and population of 2.21%.24 This is, of course, 
the type of change that could be associated with further Scottish fiscal autonomy that required 
some rise in tax revenues to improve the public sector deficit. However, the scale of the deficit 
implied by current official data would imply much greater contractionary effects if the budget had 
to be balanced by this means. 
 
6.3 Time Period of Adjustment 
 
The analysis in the paper deals with long-run equilibria.  However, it is also important to 
consider the adjustment process so as to identify the length of time for equilibrium to be attained 
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and the relevant shorter-run impacts.  In Figure 3 we plot the period by period percentage changes 
for population and employment disaggregated by sector for the introduction of the tartan tax 
where α and β are both unity.  Note that the adjustment process, which depends on the interaction 
of migration and investment decisions, is rather protracted, as others have found in a U.K. context 
(e.g. Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989).  It takes over 10 years for 75% of the long-run equilibrium 
total employment and population increase to be achieved.  Also the short-run movements in 
sectoral employment in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing traded sectors differ markedly 
from their long-run solutions.  In both these sectors there is initially a sharp decline in 
employment.  This is because, with the general expansion in activity which in this case 
accompanies the introduction of the tartan tax, there will be an initial rise in the pre-tax bargained 
nominal wage, reflecting the initial reduction in the unemployment rate and the rise in the regional 
cpi.  The increased nominal wage has adverse competitiveness effects for these relatively open 
sectors.  Over time, in-migration moves the unemployment rate back towards its original level and 
positive net investment eases capacity constraints so that regional prices move back towards their 
initial values.  Therefore non-manufacturing traded initially overshoots its long-run fall in 
employment whilst it is not until period 24 that employment in manufacturing rises above its base-
year level. 
 
6.4 Migration 
 
There may be some concern at the central role played by migration in our analysis up to 
this point, particularly given that UK regional problems are often linked to restrictions in labour 
mobility. Notice, first, that there is no necessary conflict between the bargained real wage function 
and the zero net migration condition, as appears to be implied in Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1994). Indeed, in the original LNJ (1991) model of disaggregated labour markets the interaction 
of these two functions is critical in determining real wage and unemployment rates, and this is 
also true of our model. However, Blanchflower and Oswald’s (1994) objection to the Harris-
Todaro (1970) function (on which LNJ’s net migration function is based) does reflect the 
conventional wisdom in the UK that labour mobility is very low (although the objection is not 
based on estimated net migration functions, while LNJ’s analysis is.) It may therefore be worth 
noting the consequences of the limiting case of zero labour mobility. In fact the theoretical 
analysis of this case is conceptually similar to that with migration.  Employment change under 
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zero labour mobility  is positive as long as dW < - (nt/nW)dt. However, in this case the wage is 
determined by the interaction of the BRW with the labour demand function, rather than the ZNM 
function. If we suspend the estimated LNJ net migration function and instead impose the 
assumption of zero labour mobility, the employment effects of the tartan tax are considerably 
dampened under regional bargaining, with employment change ranging from a fall of 0.59% (α = 
0) to a rise of 0.94% (α = 1.0, β = 2.0). 
 
6.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
One criticism of CGE models is that they are not econometrically estimated and that the 
results might be very sensitive to imposed parameter values.  There are three broad groups of 
elasticities in AMOS: the sectoral capital stock speed of adjustment parameters, the CES 
production substitution elasticities and the substitution elasticities in intermediate and final 
demand.  In this sensitivity exercise,  the values of these parameters are selected from the ranges 
(0.2 - 0.8); (0.1 - 0.5); and  (0.1 - 4.0) respectively.  We assume that all the elasticities have 
uniform distributions that are symmetric about their means (which are the default point estimates 
in AMOS).  Following the method of Harrison and Vinod (1992), we divide the distribution into 4 
equal intervals and take the mean of each interval for perturbation.  Since there are 39 elasticities 
selected, the set of all possible parameter perturbations is 439.  However, we follow a complete 
randomized factorial design and selected only a subset (1000) of the possible configurations.  
Each of the 1000 simulations is run for 50 periods. 
 
In Figures 4 and 5 we report the results of systematic sensitivity analysis on the period-by-
period simulations for two of the (α, β) combinations reported in Table 3: (1,1) and (0.8, 1.2). In 
each period the graphs show the mean solution value of the percentage increase in total 
employment of the 1000 simulations together with the plus-or-minus-one-standard-deviation 
range of results.  Note that, in general, the one standard deviation confidence limits are small and 
fall over time.  This is because in these two cases, migration and investment reduce the price 
deviations upon which the production and demand elasticities bite. This is particularly apparent in 
the simulation where α and  β are both unity.  In this case we know that in the long-run Input-
Output results hold, so that there are no relative price changes and the confidence range ultimately 
collapses to a single point (McGregor et al, 1996b).  
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7. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this paper we focus primarily on the potential welfare effects of the Scottish Parliament 
exercising its current limited degree of fiscal autonomy through the exercise of its tax-varying  
powers.  Algebraic and geometric analysis, using a regional general equilibrium variant of the 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) model, provide powerful conceptual insights, including 
extension of conventional balanced-budget multiplier analysis to accommodate the supply side in 
a long-run, regional context. However, apart from a limited set of special cases, they do not give 
easily signed and comprehensible results for the variables central to the current policy debate: the 
change in employment and population.  Numerical CGE simulation suggests that the welfare 
success of the policy will depend crucially not only on the value of the resulting amenity to the 
local population but also on the extent to which this is reflected in a moderation of local pay 
claims.  Such moderation would not be available in a perfectly competitive labour market where 
there is no mechanism to internalise the benefit of the publicly provided externality, and our 
simulations suggest that the balanced budget employment and population multipliers would be 
negative in such circumstances. However, in an imperfectly competitive labour market, where 
unions are concerned with the general welfare of their members, or where the nominal wage is set 
exogenously, such inverted Haavelemo effects may not be apparent. Rather, there may be 
significant potential welfare benefits to Scotland from the introduction of this fiscal innovation.  
 
Our analysis also has implications for the wider debate on regional fiscal issues. If 
Scotland (and Wales and Northern Ireland) in fact has a significant structural public sector deficit, 
as official data and most commentators maintain, greater fiscal autonomy that necessitated some 
movement towards balance in regional public sector budgets may be associated with significant 
risks to economic activity in the peripheral economies of the UK, and therefore to regional equity. 
Even under the present fiscal arrangements, continuing commitment to the Barnett formula would 
exert a real resource squeeze on the peripheral regions of the UK. In these cases the 
contractionary impact on aggregate demand is reinforced by non-positive supply side influences 
operating through a combination of reduced amenity and increased tax effects on migration and 
wage bargaining. While the microeconomic case for the efficiency and other beneficial effects of 
greater fiscal autonomy may be considered persuasive (although see e.g. Gordon, 1983, Donahue, 
 
 21 
1997 and Rodden, 2002), the macroeconomic consequences should not be neglected since our 
analysis here suggests that these may be substantial. Efficiency gains from full fiscal autonomy 
would have to be substantial to outweigh the probable adverse macroeconomic consequences. Our 
analysis suggests that further reform of the system of regional public finance should proceed with 
caution, and that some form of equalisation mechanism should be in place to mitigate any adverse 
macroeconomic consequences for the peripheral regions of the UK.  
 
Future research could usefully extend the analysis in at least two directions. First, we have 
concentrated primarily on the consequences of exercising the existing degree of Scottish fiscal 
autonomy. While we have noted the relevance of this analysis to the wider debate on greater fiscal 
autonomy in the UK, many detailed aspects of such autonomy, including the possibility of greater 
 tax-varying powers, remain to be explored. Secondly, the single region context of our current 
analysis abstracts from any induced spillover and feedback effects, and is clearly incapable of 
providing an analysis of the UK devolution programme as a whole. For a UK-wide perspective we 
believe that it is important to develop an explicitly interregional approach that will facilitate, inter 
alia,  investigation of the potential for gains through economic policy coordination among 
devolved authorities. 
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Table 2. Long-run % change in population after the introduction of the "tartan tax" 
              
α 
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 
β    
0.00 -1.41 -1.41 -1.41 -1.41 -1.41 -1.41 
0.20 -1.36 -1.30 -1.23 -1.17 -1.10 -1.04 
0.40 -1.32 -1.19 -1.06 -0.93 -0.80 -0.67 
0.60 -1.27 -1.08 -0.88 -0.69 -0.49 -0.30 
0.80 -1.22 -0.97 -0.71 -0.45 -0.18 0.08 
1.00 -1.18 -0.86 -0.53 -0.20 0.13 0.46 
1.20 -1.13 -0.74 -0.35 0.04 0.44 0.84 
1.40 -1.09 -0.63 -0.18 0.29 0.75 1.22 
1.60 -1.04 -0.52 0.00 0.53 1.06 1.60 
1.80 -0.99 -0.41 0.18 0.78 1.38 1.99 
2.00 -0.95 -0.30 0.36 1.03 1.70 2.38 
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Table 3: Long-run % change in key economic variables following the imposition of the 
"tartan tax" 
 Regional Bargaining  
 β=0 α=β=1 α=0 α=0.8 
   β=1 β=1.2 
  GDP (@ income measure)        
      
-1.30 0.47 -1.16 0.44 
  Consumption                       -1.65 -0.71 -1.56 -0.73 
  Govt expend.                      2.40 2.70 2.42 2.69 
  Investment                        -0.99 0.48 -0.88 0.45 
  Nominal pre-tax wage           1.75 0.00 1.62 0.04 
  Real post-tax consumption 
wage         
0.00 -1.16 -0.09 -1.14 
  Total employment (000's):         -1.41 0.46 -1.26 0.42 
    Manufacturing:                  -1.78 0.02 -1.64 -0.02 
    Non-Manu traded:                -2.20 -0.07 -2.03 -0.11 
    Sheltered:                      -0.43 1.22 -0.29 1.19 
  Unemployment rate (%)           
  
0.00 0.00 0.81 0.19 
  Total population (000's)          -1.41 0.46 -1.18 0.44 
  Price of value added:              
    Manufacturing                   1.45 0.00 1.34 0.03 
    Non-Manu traded                 1.34 0.00 1.24 0.03 
    Sheltered                       1.55 0.00 1.43 0.03 
  Capital rental rates:              
    Manufacturing                   0.49 0.00 0.46 0.01 
    Non-Manu traded                 0.49 0.00 0.45 0.01 
    Sheltered                       0.49 0.00 0.45 0.01 
  Consumer price index              0.57 0.00 0.53 0.01 
  Value-added:                       
    Manufacturing                   -1.70 0.02 -1.56 -0.02 
    Non-Manu Traded                 -2.08 -0.07 -1.92 -0.11 
    Sheltered                       -0.37 1.22 -0.24 1.19 
  Capital stocks:                    
    Manufacturing                   -1.41 0.02 -1.30 -0.01 
    Non-Manu Traded                 -1.83 -0.07 -1.69 -0.11 
    Sheltered                       -0.05 1.22 0.05 1.19 
  Exports:                    
    Manufacturing                   -1.29 0.00 -1.19 -0.03 
    Non-Manu Traded                 -1.93 0.00 -1.78 -0.04 
    Sheltered                       -2.77 0.00 -2.55 -0.06 
  Real income (CPI deflator):        
    Households disposable           -1.65 -0.71 -1.57 -0.73 
    Firms disposable                -1.34 0.03 -1.23 0.00 
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Figure 2  Long-run % change in population after the introduction of a tartan tax
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Figure 3 Long-run % changes in sectorally disaggregated employment and population following the 
imposition of the "Tartan Tax"
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Figure 4. The sensitivity of total employment to parameter variability (for α = β =1) 
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Figure 5. The sensitivity of total employment to parameter variability (for α = 0.8  
and β =1) 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
 
1. For a general review of CGEs see Shoven and Whalley (1992). Rickman and Partridge (1998) 
provides a critical review of the literature on regional CGEs. 
2. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, chpt. 6) also assume competitive commodity markets in 
their exposition of disaggregated labour markets.  
3. This function has its roots in Harris and Todaro (1970) and has been widely employed 
elsewhere. See e.g. Greenwood et al (1991) and Treyz et al (1993) for applications in a U.S. 
context, and Bradley et al (1995) and Ermisch (1995) for Irish studies. 
4. For simplicity, we abstract from changes in the participation rate in the theoretical analysis. 
We do allow for this, however, in our subsequent simulations. 
5. Conventional regional policy wisdom in the U.K. is predicated upon a judgement of very 
immobile labour in which case equation (1) would be non-binding. We consider the implications 
of modifying our migration assumptions in Section 6 of the paper. 
6. No nominal inertia is implied by this formulation, which is a re-parameterised version of a 
specification in which labour demand is a declining function of the real product wage. 
7. Silvestre  (e.g. 1990), describes this general equilibrium labour demand curve as the "full" 
demand curve for labour.  
8. The labour supply decision could, of course, be influenced by the amenity if, for example, the 
amenity were complementary to leisure. 
9. The normalisation adopted is to set the initial values of w, W, N and cpi to unity and the initial 
value of t to zero. 
10. Where β > 1, so that the ZNM function falls, either the BRW function actually rises or it falls 
by a smaller amount than the ZNM function. 
11. For extreme values of nU and n1, the coefficient on dn will be positive.  However, this implies 
a perverse system in which total employment falls with an expansion in exogenous employment. 
 This requires that, as unemployment declines, the negative employment effects of lower welfare 
payments dominate the original employment expansion. 
12. The ZEC function would also pass through the point P but would slope less steeply.  
13. AMOS is an acronym for a macro-micro model of Scotland.  The model is calibrated using a 
Social Accounting Matrix based around the latest available complete Input-Output Table for 
Scotland which is for 1989. 
 
14. Manufacturing comprises sectors 12-89; non-manufacturing traded, sectors 1-10, 91-97, 99-
102 and 109-111; and the sheltered, sectors 11, 90, 98, 103-108 and 112-114 in the 1989 Scottish 
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Input-Output Tables. (Scottish Office, 1994)  
15. Our treatment of long-run equilibria is identical to that employed in Harrison et al  (1997) EJ 
paper. 
16. The speed of adjustment parameter is 0.5.  This process of capital accumulation is compatible 
with a simple theory of firm's optimal behaviour given the assumption of quadratic adjustment 
costs.  This method of investment determination is also equivalent to capital stock adjustment 
motivated by the desire to equilibrate the user costs of capital and capital rental rates. 
17. The compact form of AMOS abstracts from the complexities of distributional considerations 
and the detailed production structure. Details are available in Harrigan et al (1991). 
18. The scale of AMOS relative to the analytical model of Sections 2 and 3 reflects its sectoral 
disaggregation and its complete specification of commodity demands and supplies and income 
transfer system that underly the general equilibrium demand curve for labour. 
19. Earlier versions of this paper used the £390m figure (at 1995prices) for the yield of the tartan 
tax that was given in response to a parliamentary question from Peter Brook, Hansard, 1st May, 
1996, column 1149.   
20. The proportionate employment change figures are very close to those for population change 
and the cells which mark the boundary between positive and negative values are the same for the 
two variables. 
21. In AMOS with national bargaining the pre-tax nominal wage is fixed at its initial level.  
23.The formula, named after Joel Barnett, then Labour's Chief Secretary to the Treasury, was 
based on 1976 population figures. It originally allocated Scotland £10 and Wales £5 for every 
£85 change in expenditure on comparable English programmes.(See  e.g. Bell et al, 1997.) This 
meant that Scotland received 11.6% and Wales 5.88% of any change in English expenditure. 
Michael Portillo, who was Chief Secretary to the Treasury in 1992, cut Scotland's share to 
10.66% of changes in comparable English programmes and 10.06% of changes in combined 
English and Welsh programmes such as Law and Order. 
24. In McGregor et al (1995), we begin to explore the consequences of moving from the current 
"soft" regional budget constraints to the hard constraints that would bind under independence. In 
McGregor and Swales (2005) we provide a non-technical overview of the economics of 
devolution/ decentralisation in a UK context. 
 
 
